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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ROBERT E. SIMMONS, CHARRIE BREN-
NAN, DAVID A. WILLIAMS, LOUIE A. 
SHORT, PATRICIAL L. CASTILLO, 
BETH L. HURST, and JAY EZRA REA, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of Public 




Petition and Brief for Rehearing 
Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter hereby 
petition the Supreme Court of the State of Utah for 
a rehearing of the decision heretofore rendered in 
this case which was filed on the 1st day of April, 
1970, on the grounds that: (1) the Court failed to 
comprehend the full scope of the statutory investi-
gative duties of the Financial Responsibility Divi-
sion and the statutory limits on the agency's acting 
on the acquired information; and (2) the Court's 
Order enforcing the Order of Suspension fails to 
consider the remaining cause of action in the re-
spondents' Complaints which was not considered 
by the District Court, to wit: whether or not there 
2 
was a probability of liability on the part of each of 
these plaintiffs, and this matter if the Opion of April ' 
1st 1970 is not altered should now be remanded to 
the District Court for further consideration with the 
stays heretofore being granted being kept in full 
force and effect until said matters are heard by the 
District Court. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS' 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This case concerns the legality of eight driver's 
license revocations by the appellant State of Utah 
under the Utah Financial Responsibility Laws, Sec-
tions 41-12-1, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
PRIOR DISPOSITION 
Each of the respondents, an uninsured motorist, 
was involved in an automobile accident. Acting up-
on the information available to it, the official reports 
required and authorized by Sections 41-6-35 through 
40, Utc.h Code Annotated 1953, the Financial Re-
sponsibility Division of the Department of Public 
Safety issued an Order to each of the respondents 
requiring in the alternative either a security deposit 
or the suspension of their drivers' licenses. Pursuant 
to Section 41-12-2(b), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
s3.id Orders were appealed to the Third Judicial Dis-
Lf'.cr Court, \'\'here, after review of the cases, )l1cig2 
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Bryant H. Croft ordered the permanent injunction of 
each of the Orders on the grounds that provisions 
of Section 41-12-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953 
I 
would not permit the appellant to issue such orders 
solely upon the basis of the official reports submitted 
to the Financial Responsibility Division. This de-
cision was appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, which by Opinion filed April 1st, 1970, 
reversed the decision of Judge Croft and ordered 
the Orders enforced. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents in this action were all unin-
sured motorists who were involved in automobile 
accidents. Upon the receipts of the various reports 
required and authorized by the provisions of Sec-
tions 41-6-35 through 40 and Sections 41-12-1, et seq., 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, the Financial Responsi-
bility Division of the Department of Public Safety 
determined that in each accident, there was per-
sonal injury or property damage in excess of $100.00, 
and, after determining the precise amount required 
to be posted as security in each instance, ordered 
each of the respondents to post that amount of secur-
ity or suffer the suspension of their drivers' licenses 
and motor vehicle registrations. There was no de-
termination of either the probability of responsibility 
or whether any injured party desired the issuance 
of the Orders. The Orders were appealed pursuant 
to Section 41-12-2(b), Utah Code Annotated 1953, to 
the District Court, which enjoined those Orders on 
the ground that such an Order requiring either the 
posting of security or suffering suspension of 
driver's license could not be issued if only the of-
ficial reports had been submitted to the Commis-
sion.1 Judge Croft ruled that the provisions of Section 
41-12-S(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, required that 
evidence in addition to these reports had to be sub-
mitted by an injured party or on his behalf before 
the Commission was authorized to issue such an 
Order. That decision was reversed by this Court in 
its decision of April 1st, 1970. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
- Respondents seek a reversal of the Opinion 
rendered by this Court on April 1st, 1970, and the af-
firming of Judge Croft's holding that the evidence 
submitted to the Commission was not sufficient un-
der the laws of Utah to require the issuing of the 
Orders requiring the posting of security or suspen-
sion of driver's license of each of the respondents, 
or in the alternative, a modification of the Order of 
the Court requiring these matters remanded to the 
District Court for further proceedings on the allega-
tions of the Complaints that there is no probability 
that the respondents will be responsible for the ac-
cidents. This issue was not considered by the 
District Court because it found no reason to consider 
these allegations after rendering the initial decision 
in this manner. 
l"Commission" is defined in Section 41-12-l(a), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as "The department of public safety" and as used in this brief 
shall refer to the Financial Responsibility Division of the Department 




THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ERRED IN ITS DECISION OF APRIL !ST, 1970, IN 
THIS MATIER IN THAT THE COURT FAILED TO 
COMPREHEND THE FULL SCOPE OF THE STATU-
TORY INVESTIGATIVE DUTIES OF THE FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY DIVISION AND THE STATUTORY 
LIMITS ON THE AGENCY'S ACTING ON THE 
ACQUIRED INFORMATION. 
In the Opinion of April 1st, 1970, Justice Ellett, 
speaking for the Court, stated regarding the crucial 
language of Section 41-12-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 
1953: 
"The commission shall determine the 
amount of security deposited upon the 
basis of the reports or other evidence sub-
mitted to it but shall not require a deposit 
or security for the benefit of any person 
when evidence has not been submitted by 
such person or on his behalf as to the 
extent of his injuries or damage to his 
property within fifty (50) days follow-
ing the day of accident .... " (Emphasis 
added) 
"The underscored portion of the sentence 
indicates that someone other than the driver 
may also be able to satisfy any judgment re-
covered by him from the security posted but 
only if such other person files his proof within 
50 days from the accident. These other people, 
such as passengers in the car, pedestrians, and 
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nondriving owners, are not required by the 
statute to file a report, but if they are to take 
advantage of the security, they must file proof 
of their damage within 50 days." (Emphasis 
added) 
It would be respectfully submitted that this rationale 
and holding on the part of the Court is in error, be-
cause it fails to comprehend the full scope of the 
statutory investigative duties of the Commission and 
the statutory limits on the Commission taking action 
on the acquired information. 
The key to understanding the dual nature of the 
Commission under the Motor Vehicle Code in the 
Financial Responsibility area is Section 41-6-40, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. That statute states: 
"All accident reports made by persons in-
volved in accidents or by garages will be without 
prejudice to the individual so reporting and 
shall be for the confidential use of the depart-
ment or other state agencies having use for the 
records for accident prevention purposes, or for 
the administration of the laws of this state relat-
ing to the deposit of security and proof of finan-
cial responsibility by persons driving or the 
owners of motor vehicles . ... " (Emphasis add-
ed) 
It is clear from this provisions that the Commission 
has two statutory duties it must fulfill from the re-
ports it is to gather as provided in Sections 41-6-3:1 
through 40, Utah Code Annotated 1953. It is to ev'!l-
1 lhem accident prevention purposes and to 
e.: se th'c :Jn us a basis to enforce the financial respon-
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sibility laws. In so doing, it must require reports 
from all witnesses to an accident. Section 41-6-35(b), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. The language of that 
statute is "may", but as will be pointed out infra, 
the information of all witnesses must be obtained 
if the Commission is to carry out its proper statutory 
function. This gathering of information has in turn 
two aspects. The first is a determination of what 
occurred. The second is what are the consequences 
of those events. 
In determining what occurred, the Commission 
uses the reports to see what could have been done 
to prevent the accident-what caused it. Then, it 
reports its findings to the Legislature in the form of 
recommended changes in the Motor Vehicle Code. 
In the area of fin an c i a 1 responsibility, the 
Commission determines if there is a probability of 
responsibility. If there is, and the driver is either 
without insurance or not covered by one of the ex-
ceptions of Section 41-12-6, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, an Order requiring either the posting of secur-
ity or suspension of the driver's license of the oper-
ator may be issued if the other conditions of the 
Financial Responsibility Laws are complied with by 
the Commission. Hague v. Department of Public Safety, 
________ Utah 2d. ________ , 462 P.2d 418 (1969). 
However, the Commission to determine fully 
what occurred must inquire fully into all the dam3ges 
resulting from the accident. It must find out th2 
extent of the injuries of everyone injured by the 
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accident.2 If it does not do so, it will not be properly 
carrying out the legislative command to work on 
accident prevention because it will not know every-
thing about the accident. Even more to the cur-
rent point of inquiry, it will not be able to require 
the culpable uninsured individual to post sufficient 
security to "satisfy any judgment or judgments for 
damages resulting from such accident." (Emphasis 
added) Section 41-12-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 
1953. The Commission must determine the extent 
and value of all damages to every party injured in an 
accident in order to carry out its mandate. It is to use 
the reports required and autohrized by Sections 41-
6-35 through 40, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to make 
this determination. Sections 41-12-4 and 5(a), Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. To carry out this function, 
the Commission is authorized to require a report 
from all witnesses. Section 41-6-35(b), Utah C ode 
Annotated 1953. This term "witness" means anyone 
who can provide information about an accident. 
This includes damages as well as events and this 
provision has been so construed by the Commission 
which has sent personal injury reports to treating 
physicians (e.g. Williams). It also sends damage re-
ports to damaged third parties, e.g., Utah Power and 
Light Co., if one of their poles is struck during the 
course of an accident, even though there is no 
specific authority to do so elsewhere in the Motor 
2An example of this type of inquiry are the current laws regarding 
seat belts, flasher lights, etc., all of which come from inquiries into 
accidents. The laws regarding seat belts come from investigating in-
juries while those regarding flashers come from inquiries into the 
causes of accidents. 
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Vehicle Code. In sum, anyone who is injured must 
be asked about his injury if the amount of security 
to be required is to be set at a level sufficiently high 
to "satisfy any judgment or judgments." Thus, any .znd 
all injured parties must be sent report forms by the 
the Commission if it is to accurately set the level of 
security to be required. This is the meaning not only 
of Section 41-6-35(b), Utah Code Annotated 1953, it 
is also the meaning of Section 41-12-5(a), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as clear from the language "judg-
ment or judgments." 
Accordingly, the error in the Court's prior Opin-
ion is clear. The Court felt that injured nonparties 
(i.e., passengers, pedestrians, and nondriving own-
ers) were not required to file reports and the lan-
guage "for the benefit of any person" referred to 
them. It does not. These persons must be required to 
submit reports if the Commission carries out its stat-
utory duties.3 
The Commission, having completed its required 
investigations, may issue an Order only if the in-
jured party or parties desire the issuance of such an 
Order and file proof of their damages in accordance 
with the statute to invoke it. The language of Section 
41-12-S(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
"The commission shall determine the amount 
of security deposited upon the basis of the re-
3Jt should be noted by the Court that the construction of the statute 
articulated by the Court was never put forward by the appellant at 
any stage of these proceedings. This is because the Commission in-
terpreted the statute as has been outlined above and they have acted 
accordingly. 
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ports or other evidence submitted to it but 
shall not require a deposit of security for the 
benefit of any person when evidence has not 
been submitted by such person or on his behalf 
as to the extent of his injuries or damage to his 
property within fifty (50) days following the 
day of accident .... " (Emphasis added) 
requires this Court to hold that before the Commis-
sion is empowered to issue an Order requiring 
either the posting of security or the suspension of a 
driver's license, the party entitled to and for whose 
benefit such an order is to be issued must act affirm-
atively by submitting evidence of his damage.4 
POINT II. 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ORDERING 
THE AFFIRMATION OF THE ORDERS OF THE DE-
FENDANT INSTEAD OF REMANDING THEM FOR 
FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT. 
In the Complaints filed in the District Court in 
each of these matters, it was alleged that each of the 
respondents would not be found responsible for 
damages as a result of the accident in which they 
were involved. Each of these cases was decided be-
fore the publication of the Opinion of this Court in 
Hague v. Department of Public Safety, ________ Utah 2d. _____ ... , 
462 P.2d 418 (1969), and when Judge Croft decided 
these cases, he held no evidence for the injured 
drivers having been submitted to the Commission, 
4The detailed arguments in support of this having been presented to 
this Court in the Respondents' Brief, will not be set forth in full 
here. 
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the Orders were invalid, and, therefore, he had n0 
reason to consider the issue of responsibility. Ac-
cordingly, each of these cases should be remanded 
for further hearings on the issue of the responsibility 
of each of the respondents for damages if the Court 
does not reverse itself as has been heretofore urged, 
for further determination as to whether or not orders 
should be enforced or stayed. 
CONCLUSION 
In the Opinion filed April 1st, 1970, the Court 
erred in failing to properly comprehend the full 
scope of the investigatory functions of the Depart-
ment of Public Safety and the statutory limits on the 
Commission's ability to act on the acquired informa-
tion. Accordingly, when the statutes are properly 
viewed and construed, the Court should reverse its 
decision of April 1st, 1970, and affirm the decision of 
Judge Croft. However, if the Court determines not 
to so reconsider this matter, it should then, rather 
than enforcing the Order as was done in the Opinion 
of April 1st, 1970, remand each of these cases for 
further consideration of the issue of responsibility in 
the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DA YID S. DOLOWITZ 
Salt Lake County Bar Legal 
Services 
Attorney for Respondents 
F. ROBERT REEDER 
Attorney for Respondent 
Jay Ezra Rea 
